The Ottomans in the Mediterranean in the later fifteenth century : the strategy of Mehmet II by Fleet, Kate
The Ottomans in the Mediterranean 
in the Later Fifteenth Century: 
the Strategy of Mehmed 11 
Kate Fleet 
Under the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (1444-1446, 1451-1481), the 
Ottoman empire greatly expanded its territories eastwards across 
Anatolia, north across the Black Sea and westwards across the 
Balkans. Part of this expansion was into the eastern Mediterranean, a 
zone dominated by the Italian city states of Venice and Genoa which 
had commercial interests and territorial holdings there. Two major 
calculations lay behind Mehmed's policy in the Mediterranean: 
strategic requirement and economic interest. From a strategic point of 
view, Mehmed needed to protect his territories, Ottoman commercial 
shipping and military transportation at sea as well as to secure his 
advance westwards. From an economic point of view, he wanted to 
control maritime trade routes and to take over commercial interests and 
economic assets. His strategy of conquest consisted of a combination 
of direct conquest, temporary tributary arrangements and more long-
term alliances, and his success was due in particular to the cautious 
speed of conquest, the internal divisions of the region and his ability to 
manipulate and benefit from them. 
Strategic requirements 
When Mehmed came to the throne his state was in effect divided in 
two, the Asian and European territories separated by the Straits which 
ran between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and which were 
both dominated by Constantinople and allowed the city to survive. The 
significance to the Latins of control of this waterway was recognised 
by Giovan Maria Angiolello, captured by the Ottomans at Negroponte 
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(Euboea) in 1470, who regarded their inability to stop the Ottomans 
passing from Anatolia to Europe as a major reason for Christian failure 
during the crusade ofVarna.1 Well aware of the "great difficulties" which 
Latin ships in the Straits had caused his father Murad II, Mehmed was 
determined to remove this threat.2 One of his first actions, therefore, 
after taking the throne was to erect a fortification, Rumeli Hisan, on the 
European shore opposite Anadolu Hisan on the Asian side, equipping 
it with cannon whose immense cannon balls sped along the surface of 
the sea "as if they were swimming".3 Built "in order to deny passage to 
all vessels, big and small, sailing from the Black Sea toward our [i.e. 
the Byzantine] harbour and to provide easy passage from Asia Minor to 
Thrace for his [Mehmed's] troops";+ this fortification secured Ottoman 
control of the waterway. 
Mehmed's next target was Constantinople which he described in the 
words attributed to him by Kritoboulos, who wrote a biography of 
Mehmed and whom Mehmed appointed governor of Imbros (lmvroz, 
modern Gokc;:eada), as "always fighting against us, lying in wait for 
our goods and battening on our misfortunes and injuring us as much 
as possible".5 For Kritoboulos, Mehmed "thought, as was true, that if 
he could succeed in capturing it and becoming master of it, there was 
nothing to hinder him from sallying forth from it in a short time, as from 
a stronghold for all the environs, and overrunning all and subduing 
them to himself' .6 Constantinople fell in May 1453. 
With the Straits now under his control and Constantinople in his hands, 
Mehmed was able to turn his attention to the Aegean. The islands there 
posed a strategic threat. Those close to the entrance to the Dardanelles, 
Imbros and Limnos (Lemnos),7 threatened his movement in and out of the 
Straits. The islands of Cyprus and Crete provided major bases for Venetian 
naval activity and Chios, close up to the Anatolian coast opposite izmir, 
posed a potential threat as a base for hostile activity against Ottoman 
territory. Rhodes was a very well located base for Hospitaller operations 
against the Ottomans, dominating the north-south sea route and being 
close to the Ottoman mainland. All these islands in Venetian, Genoese 
or Hospitaller hands represented further danger as bases for pirates and 
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corsairs who could operate from them with impunity. Corsairs, "noted 
for energy and courage", who "cut the roads and caused every kind of 
damage to the traders and captured the travellers"8 in the estimation of 
Mustafa Celalzade, were supplied by the islanders of Naxos9 and by 
the Gattilusio of Lesbos.lO Catalan pirate attacks from Rhodes against 
Ottoman territory were one of the reasons for the Ottoman expedition into 
the Aegean under Yunus in 1455." The islands also provided accessible 
locations for runaway slaves, a problem of economic significance in a 
world in which slave labour played such a major role. 
Mehmed needed therefore either to conquer or to neutralise these 
islands. In 1455 he despatched two expeditions into the Aegean. That 
under Hamza attacked Chios and Kos, and that under Yunus sailed 
against Naxos and the islands near Rhodes, 12 attacking Kos but failing to 
take the fortress and retreating "leaving behind many Turks, some slain 
by the fortress's garrison" and some victims of "intestinal disease",13 
and taking the Genoese settlements of Old and New Phokaea on the 
Anatolian mainland near izmir. Limnos fell in 1456 as did Enez (Ainos) 
on the north Aegean coast south of Edime which was taken "before the 
explosion of cannon had even had time to deafen the ears of the effete 
infidels" .1-1 Although his actions resulted in the arrival of a papal fleet 
in 1456, the expedition was largely ineffective and sailed away again, 
leaving very little disruption in its wake. Lesbos was captured by the 
Ottomans in 1462 and its ruler, Domenico Gattilusio, "drawn into the 
chain of subjection" .15 
From early on in his reign Mehmed began to expand his territories 
westwards across the Balkans, conquering the Peloponnese (Morea, 
Mora) and moving through Serbia, Bosnia and into Albania. Ottoman 
forces even raided Friuli, appearing within sight of Venice itself. In 1480 
an Ottoman fleet under Gedik Ahmed Pa§a, described by Angiolello, 
who was later to serve with him, as a much loved and brave man,16 took 
Zakynthos (Zante), Cephalonia, where the population, having lost faith 
in the administration, sued for peace,17 and, defeating all in his path, 
Venetian, Genoese, French or Spanish,18 Lefkas (Lefkada, Santa Maura, 
Ayamavra), from where he sent the population to Istanbul. I9 
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Mehmed had Italian ambitions. In 1472, after the fall of Negroponte, 
Venice noted "the threatening advance" of the Ottomans towards Italy.20 
As early as 1463, Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga had written from Rome 
to his father Lorenzo n, saying that Mehmed had conquered Bosnia 
and "many hold that, unless the Turk is strongly opposed, in less than 
a year and a half he will take a great part of Italy" .21 Slightly later than 
Gonzaga had predicted, Gedik Ahmed Pa§a sailed across the Adriatic in 
1480 and captured Otranto, "the key to Italy".22 Sigismondo de'Conti 
noted the suspicion that the hand of Venice lay behind this attack, a 
suspicion he could not himself, however, confirm.23 ThatVenice was in 
fact implicated in some way is supported by Setton who has noted that 
"If they [the Venetians] did not in fact encourage the sultan to attack 
southern Italy, they certainly kept his secret" .24 Having taken Otranto, 
the Ottoman forces quickly rebuilt it, strengthening its defences with 
walls and a double ditch25 before conducting raids against Brindisi, 
Lecce and Taranto. For contemporaries, the war for Italy had now 
begun26 and many feared for the fate of the peninsula.27 
The Peloponnese, with its abundance of provisions and its location, 
was an essential base for Mehmed in his advance westwards and its 
conquest was "of the first importance, because of the war against the 
Italians he was planning for the near future" .28 But the Peloponnese 
was also an essential part of Venice's trade set up in the eastern 
Mediterraean and Venice held Negroponte and Modon (Methoni) and 
Koron (Koroni), "the right eye of Venice",29 on the southern tip of the 
Peloponnese. These locations, together with Crete and Cyprus, gave 
Venice naval dominance in the Aegean. Venice had major commercial 
interests in the region and these bases were essential for their protection. 
From the Ottoman point of view Venetian dominance in the eastern 
Mediterranean was not acceptable while Ottoman advance there and in 
the Peloponnese greatly threatened Venetian trade. The result was a war 
between Venice and Mehmed which broke out in 1463. According to 
Sphrantzes, the Venetians planned the war against the sultan "in order 
to take over the Morea by all possible means" .30 In a letter dated May 
1459 to the Franciscan preacher, Jacopo dell a Marca, papal nuncio in 
the March of Ancona, Bessarion wrote from Ferrara about the situation 
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in the Peloponnese, and described the great wealth of the region, noting 
that "that country can support fifty thousand horsemen without having 
to seek food from any other source" ,31 the importance of provisioning 
troops being stressed also by Bartolomeo Minio, provveditor and 
capitanio at Napoli di Romania (Nauplia, Nafplio) in a report to the 
Senate in which he stated that the Ottomans were determined to seize 
territory in order to prevent soldiers from surviving there.32 
The war was ultimately concluded, most unsatisfactorily from a 
Venetian point of view, in 1479 when, "showing inferiority and shame", 
the Venetians "threw themselves on the mercy of the sultan", as the 
Ottoman grand vezir Karamanh Ni~ancl Mehmed Pa~a put it:13 The 
war cost Venice heavily both in terms of territory, the Serenissma 
loosing Limnos, Shkoder in Albania and lands in the Peloponnese, 
and money, the financial settlement imposed being a substantial one 
for Venice but "less that a simple, salty drop in the great sweet water 
oceans"34 for the Ottomans according to Mehmed Pa~a, but one which 
the Ottoman ruler nevertheless accepted "graciously and with great 
pleasure" ,35 symbolising, as it did, a humiliating defeat for the foremost 
Mediterranean naval power of the period. 
Venice had lost Negroponte in 1470 when Mehmed had despatched 100 
ships, "the smallest [of which] resembled a mountain"36 to the "country 
of the evil one"3? and when fighting had been so intense that combatants 
were "hair to hair, beard to beard" ,38 but retained control of Crete (until 
1669), Cyprus (until 1571) and Modon and Koron (until 1500). From 
a strategic point of view, Mehmed in fact had no need to conquer these 
places, an undertaking which would in any case have been extremely 
difficult to pull off. Venice was sufficiently weakened by defeat in 
the war and had no interest in provoking further hostility. It needed 
its commerce and was already having to pay heavily to maintain and 
protect it,39 and thus a peaceful modus vivendi with Mehmed was its 
only option. 
For the Ottomans reaching such a modus vivendi was easier to organise 
with the Genoese and was implemented much earlier and without 
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resorting to any major military operations. Mehmed's relationship 
with the Genoese was less confrontational, partly due to the greater 
accommodation which Genoa, or more precisely the Genoese colonies, 
had traditionally pursued with the Ottomans and also due to the smaller 
level of Genoese activity in this period. Chios was put under pressure 
early on in Mehmed's reign when in 1455 Hamza demanded payment 
by the Chiotes of 40,000 ducats owed to Francesco de Draperis, a major 
Genoese alum merchant who held the concessions for alum mines in 
Ottoman territory40 and who was described in the instructions given by 
the Venetian Senate to Lorenzo Moro, envoy to Mehmed II in 1451, 
as "Genoese and a subject of the emperor of the Turks". Moro was 
instructed, among other things, to get Mehmed or Ottoman officials to 
force Francesco to pay a Venetian, Giovanni de Mercato Novo, who had 
conducted business with Francesco through a factor called Domenico 
de Magistris, the considerable sum of money he owed him.41 Anxious to 
ensure a peaceful co-existance with the Ottomans, the Genoese decided 
on a tributary arrangement and Chios, "the right eye of Genoa",42 thus 
remained in their hands until finally falling to the Ottomans in 1566. 
Genoese compliance, and payment of a considerable annual sum, was 
in many ways far more satisfactory for Mehmed than being forced to 
launch a full-scale attack on the island, in the process possibly (though 
probably not) provoking a response from Genoa and being left with the 
need to invest resources in retaining the island. For the success of his 
strategy in the eastern Mediterranean Mehmed did not need to occupy 
the island but compliance from those who did. 
Relations with the Hospitallers were a different issue. The Hospitallers 
were a hostile presence close to Ottoman mainland territory. Rhodes, a 
magnate for "disruptive" Franks from Genoa, Venice and other places 
and a "source of evil and sedition and a gathering point for the people 
of immorality" ,43 was the stronghold of the Hospitallers who "wander 
night and day and pillage on the face of the sea".44 The island was, as 
Caoursin noted, a most suitable naval base and an excellent location 
from which to attack the Ottomans.45 From here the Hospitallers preyed 
on Ottoman shipping and seized Muslim pilgrims:-l6 Tanse1 argues that 
its location between Istanbul and Egypt rendered its capture essential 
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for the conquest of Egypt,47 which actually fell to the Ottomans in 
1517, three years before Rhodes. There is evidence that at the end of 
his reign, Mehmed was contemplating an attack on the Mamluks,-t8 
which, if so, would have made capture of Rhodes of importance not 
just for his Aegean policy but also for any land campaign to the south. 
In any case, the location of Rhodes and the presence of the Hospitallers 
meant that, as Kemalpa~azade remarked, it had "become necessary 
to eradicate this base of sedition" .49 A large force of ships and 30,000 
men, according to Oru9,50 were despatched to Rhodes in May 148051 
under the command of Mesih Pa~a, whom Spandounes noted "was 
of the house of Palaiologos" and his relative, having been captured 
together with his two brothers at the fall of Constantinople.52 Mesih 
Pa~a's expedition was, however, unsuccessful, a failure for which 
contemporaries held him responsible,53 and he was forced to withdraw 
in "defeat and shame"54 after a siege lasting 89 days. 
Economic motivation 
Mehmed's conquests in the Mediterranean were not motivated solely by 
strategic concerns, for Ottoman conquest was, as it had been from the 
early days of the state, also driven by the desire to take over economic 
assets. As the state grew and the apparatus of rule expanded, so, too, 
did its need for financial reserves, giving a further impetus to conquest. 
Control of the Straits was not just about the safe passage between the 
east and west sections of Ottoman territory, but also about the ability to 
levy tax on all shipping passing along it to and from Constantinople, the 
Black Sea and the Mediterranean.55 The capture of Constantinople itself 
was also economically motivated.56 
Possession of the Aegean region offered considerable economic 
advantages. It was a major trading zone for both east-west trade across 
the Mediterranean, north-south trade between Istanbul and Alexandria 
and the North African coast, and trade to and from the Black Sea. Its 
ports were lucrative sources of customs and revenue, and it was also 
productive in natural resources such as salt and alum. The prosperity 
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of the region impressed Ottoman writers. Lesbos, unfortunately, as 
Tursun Bey sourly remarked, "in the hands of infidels and sinners" ,57 
was "a prosperous place" with "many blessings", so productive that, 
in the estimation of Kemalpa§azade, it "resembled the rose gardens of 
paradise" .58 The Peloponnese, too, was "full of blessings", its sheep 
lambed twice a year, its rivers were the equivalent of the Nile and the 
Euphrates, and it was unequalled in productivity.59 The commercial 
dynamism of the markets and ports was also noted. Rhodes was a 
"great business house of the wealth of the Franks"60 and Negroponte 
"a market place of the great merchants of Frengistan [i.e. the land of 
the Franks] .. .full of valuable goods and merchandise and money" ,61 a 
view supported by Kemalpa§azade who spoke of "an ancient market 
town ... brimming over with silver and gold, every corner was full of 
provisions, every nook full of treasure and riches" .62 Conquest in the 
Aegean therefore offered control of trade routes and access to lucrative 
sources of income. 
The significance of control over economic assets in the region is 
highlighted by the trade in alum, a fixer in dying cloth, which was 
produced in Anatolia and was a major export item westwards.63 This 
trade was now in Ottoman hands and represented a highly lucrative 
source of income. Just how lucrative this trade was for the Ottomans is 
made clear in a letter written to the pope Pius II by Giovanni da Castro 
who discovered alum at Tolfa, near Civitavecchia, in 1461. 
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Today I bring you victory over the Turk. Every year he wrings 
from the Christians more than 300,000 ducats for the alum with 
which we dye wool various colours. For this is not found among 
the Latins except a very small quantity ... But I have found seven 
mountains so rich in this material that they could supply seven 
worlds. If you will give orders to engage workmen, build furnaces, 
and smelt the ore, you will provide all Europe with alum and the 
Turk will lose all his profits. They will accrue to you and thus 
he will suffer a double loss. There is an abundance of wood and 
water there. You have a harbor nearby in Civitavecchia where 
ships may be loaded to sail to the west. Now you may equip a war 
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against the Turks. These mines will supply you with the sinews 
of war, i.e., money, and take them from the Turks.64 
The Ottoman sinews of war, which Giovanni da Castro argued would be 
snapped by his discovery of alum at Tolfa, were also supplied by other 
Aegean sources of income. The "inviting morsel"65 of Enez, conquered 
by the Ottomans in 1456, was an obvious target. A major trading centre, 
it was known for "its great productivity, its favourable situation, its rich 
soil, and many other things" .66 Profiting "abundantly from commerce" 
with the nearby islands including Imbros and Limnos,67 the river Maritza 
(Meri<;, Evros) allowed trade with the interior, as well as producing 
"many fish of every sort, large and small and fat" .6R Enez's greatest 
asset, however, was its salt, "the greatest resource and the one in which 
it overwhelmingly excels nearly all its neighbours both in wealth and in 
revenue is the salt that is produced there, more and better than anywhere 
else. By dis'nbuting and selling it through all Thrace and Macedonia, 
the city amasses an immense quantity of gold and silver, as it were 
in a steady stream" .69 Its harbour and rich salt mines were the major 
motivation for Ottoman attack, although the anger of the Ottomans over 
the harbouring of runaway slaves there also played a part.70 
Mehmed's interest was not merely to conquer but also to maintain and 
develop the economic assets of the region. Having taken Constantinople, 
he set out to re-invigorate it and to recreate a thriving commercial 
centre, forcibly transferring population to the city from other parts 
of his empire. He showed equal concern to boost the economy of the 
islands, offering tax exemptions to those who wanted to go and settle 
on Bozcaada (Tenedos), and building a castle there to protect Ottoman 
commercial vessels,7! a policy which quickly saw an improvement in 
the conditions of the island.72 Samos (Sisam), taken by Mehmed in 
1453, had been deserted by its population which had suffered badly 
from corsair attacks. Mehmed ordered the settlement of population on 
the island, but without great success. He therefore offered an incentive 
promising those who settled there exemption from taxes (avanZ-l 
divaniye), resulting in a movement of people to the island from both 
Rumeli and Anatolia.73 
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The reasons for success 
Mehmed thus had strategic and economic reasons for a campaign of 
conquest in the eastern Mediterranean. But why was he successful? 
Although not traditionally regarded as a naval power, Colin Imber 
remarking that "the Ottoman Empire was never a first rate sea power" ,74 
the Ottomans had taken to the sea early on in the existence of the state,?5 
and Mehmed had a population to hand which included experienced 
mariners as well as Latins who moved into Ottoman employment.76 The 
pragmatic course of conquest which he adopted in the region further 
facilitated his advance. Outright conquest was not always the first, or 
indeed initially feasible, option. Control through tribute was a common 
arrangement, particularly in the early stages of Mehmed's reign, and 
one which had its attraction both for the Ottomans and the Latins. 
Dorino Gattilusio, for example, held Enez under an arrangement with 
the Ottomans whereby he paid a percentage of the production of salt 
per annum plus other annual taxes 77 and Chios "purchased a tolerable 
relationship" with Mehmed by means of an annual tribute.78 
A major factor in Ottoman success was the political nature of the region 
which prevented any unified opposition to Mehmed's advance. In this 
world, the Ottomans represented less an infidel and implacable enemy 
and more a power centre like any other. Indeed, the outlook of many 
of the local Latin lords was not so much couched in terms of the grand 
scheme of the Hospitallers waging war against the infidel or the great 
game of the Papacy driving forward a crusading Christendom, but in 
more basic terms of daily survival and retention of their island domains, 
and in consequence many of them appeared before Mehmed after the 
fall of Constantinople and offered submission. Good relations with 
Mehmed could ensure survival, the widow of Nerio Acciaiolo, ruler 
of Athens, being able to keep her position "because she had sent many 
gifts to the sultan in order to remain in power".79 
Many turned to the Ottoman ruler in their internal power struggles, much 
as the Byzantines had in the previous century. Thus when Palamedes, lord 
of Imbroz, died, leaving Enez to his son Dorino Gattilusio II and Helena 
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Notaras, the widow of his other son, Giorgio, together with her children 
as co-heirs, the widow appealed through her uncle to Mehmed against 
Dorino who was unwilling to share his inheritance. She informed the 
sultan that Dorino was plotting against him, and was in communication 
with the Italians, collecting arms and hiring mercenaries and planning 
to place garrisons on Enez and the islands.80 Thierry Gancou argues that 
Kritoboulos's account of these events is not convincing and that it was in 
fact highly unlikely that Dorino was conspiring with the Italian maritime 
powers or planning to overthrow his alliance with Mehmed, something 
he would not have been in a position to contemplate. However, given 
her very weak position, Ganchou argues, this was Helena Notoras's 
"only card" to play when approaching the sultan for supportYI Helena 
Notaras was the daughter of Loukas Notaras, the Megas Doux who 
was executed together with two of his sons by Mehmed after the fall of 
the Constantinople.82 Whether or not Dorino was acting as Kritoboulos 
describes, this event thus highlights the extent to which Istanbul was 
perceived as a centre to which Latin factions could turn in internal feuds 
and clearly illustrates the fluidity of politics in which any religious or 
ethnic consideration played a far less significant role than pragmatic 
calculations of survival. 
Infighting in the Peloponnese was most useful for the Ottomans, and 
most irritating for the Venetians who did not want to see the area 
fall to Mehmed. In 1454 the Senate despatched Vettore Capello with 
instructions to investigate the situation there. The Doge Francesco 
Foscari instructed Vettore Capello that he was to "insist upon concord 
and agreement with respect to all existing differences" between the 
despots Thomas and Demetrios and the Albanians "and to contrive 
a sound peace and harmony between them" .83 In fact, such harmony 
and peace would have suited the Ottomans at this point too, and it was 
urged on them by Turahan after his successful military incursion into 
the region in 1454. Infighting continued, however, for the various local 
lords "did not realize that they resembled fish caught in the middle of 
the net, unaware that they are all gradually being pulled toward dry 
land, but which persist until that moment to pursue and devour each 
other, so that the little fish are eaten by the big".8-+ Thomas Palaeologos 
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the despot of the Morea, transferred lands to Mehmed "as if he were 
handing cabbages from a garden" ,85 Corinth, "the head of the body of 
the Morea" ,86 fell and "pitiable Morea became a sheep in the jaws of a 
wolf,.s7 
Mehmed was well aware of the divided nature of politics in the Latin 
world, both in the Aegean and even on the Italian mainland, knowing, 
according to Benedetto Dei, "how everything in Italy was fractured and 
in a state of open war" .88 He thus sought to play one power off against 
another, balancing Venice with support for Florence, for example. 
Apart from political allegiance, the eastern Mediterranean was also 
affected by religious antagonism between Greek Orthodoxy and 
Latin Catholicism, a further division which Mehmed understood and 
attempted to manipulate. In the siege of Rhodes, Mesih Pa§a expected 
to find an island divided and "an unfaithful population, ready to rebel, 
terrorized by fear and easily corruptible with promises". 89 An appeal to 
such a division appears to have been part of his tactics, for, in reply to 
the Ottoman ambassador's call for surrender, the Grand Master's envoy 
replied that the Hospitallers were unafraid of Ottoman threats, adding 
"there is no discord between the Greeks and the Latins. We adore Christ 
with a single faith and sound spirit" .90 From an Ottoman point of view, 
such a religious divide continued to be perceived as a potential weapon. 
In 1503 Abu Bakir Darani, a captive in Rhodes, wrote to Bayezid II's 
son Korkud claiming that Hospitaller "tyranny" over the Orthodox 
population meant that the island could easily be taken.91 One of the 
reasons for the fall of Chios to the Ottomans in 1566 was, according to 
Stephan Gerlach, the dislike the local population felt for the Genoese.92 
Apart from such divisions, and perhaps precisely because of them, the 
region was a very fluid zone with constant movement from one power 
centre to another. Latins, such as the corsair Zuan Monaco Corsar093 
and the Venetian master mariner Georgio de Tragurio 9-1 could move 
over to the Ottomans while Ottoman subjects could cross to Venetian 
service, as two "Turks", described as experts in military matters, did in 
July 1466.95 Mehmed received information about Rhodes from Antonio 
Meligato, a Rhodian, and Demetrio Sofian from Negroponte, both of 
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whom had moved over to the Ottomans and knew the secrets of the 
city,96 and from Boezio, an expert in munitions and "a man of astute 
and sharp intelligence", who had gone over to the Ottomans a long 
time before and lived in Istanbul where he had a wife and children.97 
A German, he was a man of "tall stature, elegant of aspect, eloquent 
and of great shrewdness" ,98 and was much favoured by the sultan.99 
Boezio was later deployed in Rhodes as an Ottoman agent, popping up 
"unexpectedly" from an entrenchment and greeting all "as friends" and 
requesting to be allowed to enter the city. 100 
Such fluidity meant constantly shifting loyalties, such lack of constancy 
being exemplified by Doxa, the lord of Kalavryta in the Peloponnese, 
who, according to Sphrantzes, was "loyal neither to the sultan nor to the 
despots; not even, I believe, to God".'o, Alliances were not regarded as 
binding, either by the Latins or by the Ottomans, but as arrangements to 
be disposed of by the Ottomans when they felt either sufficiently strong 
to move to complete conquest or regarded it as expedient to do so, and 
to be thrown off by the Latins when they felt sure of strong external 
support. Local rulers could appeal, depending on circumstances, to 
Venice or Genoa, to the Papal forces which appeared in the waters 
of the Aegean under the command of Ludovico Trevisan in 1456 or 
to Istanbul. They could slip and slide from one side to another in an 
attempt to maintain a precarious hold on power as the Gattilusi did 
before finally loosing Lesbos in 1462 when the island was "counted 
among the countries ofIslam", a sancak beyi, kadl, dizdar, suba~l and 
sipahis were appointed, and "the clanging and echoing of bells was 
replaced by the call to prayer" .102 
Along with the internal divisions of the region, the Ottoman pragmatic 
approach of progressive conquest and a clear understanding of and 
manipUlation of the constantly shifting web ofloyalties, one might argue 
that a further factor in Ottoman success was the policy of implementing 
soft rather than hard rule. Mehmed certainly had no interest in provoking 
unnecessary hostility among his very large Orthodox population and 
the policy of leaving much administration to be run locally or of 
incorporating the Patriarch into the Ottoman governmental system 
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deflected potential clashes. Philippides has noted that when Mehmed 
took Athens, "the Orthodox clergy ... gained numerous privileges 
under the sultan, in contrast to the conditions under Latin rule" .103 
The Ottomans thus, as Molly Greene notes, "presided lightly over the 
Mediterranean world",104 in part perhaps because Ottoman pragmatism 
and flexibility, quintessential characteristics of the early empire, were 
reflected in the fluidity of the eastern Mediterranean zone, a world into 
which Ottoman control thus fitted well. 
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